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Observing the violation of Bell’s inequality tells us something about all possible future theo-
ries: they must all predict nonlocal correlations. Hence Nature is nonlocal. After an elementary
introduction to nonlocality and a brief review of some recent experiments, I argue that Nature’s
nonlocality together with the existence of free will is incompatible with the many-worlds view of
quantum physics.
PACS numbers:
I. INTRODUCTION
Imagine several persons that each separately and inde-
pendently make choices that have consequences. For the
sake of scientific analysis of this banal situation, assume
that the same set of persons can repeat again and again
the experiment, that is again and again make a free choice
and observe its consequence. Moreover, for simplicity, as-
sume that each one has a choice between a finite set of
possibilities, that we name inputs, and that the conse-
quences can be catalogued into a finite set of possible
outcomes. Once enough data are collected, the probabil-
ity of the various possible outcomes, given one possible
input per person can be estimated. For example, if there
are only two persons, that we may name Alice and Bob,
and we label their inputs x and y and their outcomes
a and b, respectively, the probability reads: p(a, b|x, y).
For conciseness, we call such a conditional probability
distribution, p(a, b|x, y), a correlation, see Fig. 1.
Correlations are observed every day everywhere and,
in particular, in all natural sciences. One could even ar-
gue that the scientific activity consists in observing cor-
relations and developing theoretical models that explain
them, i.e. that describe how they happen. For example,
if one watches a football game on a TV with the sound
shut off and one observed that all the players simultane-
ously stop running, one would speculate, as an explana-
tion based on our implicit theory of the game, that the
umpire has whistled.
Surprisingly, the number of categories of explanations
for correlations is extremely limited. Before quantum
physics, there were only two categories of explanations:
Either a first system influences a second one by sending
him some information encoded in some physical systems,
or the correlated events share some common causes in
their common past. For example, in the football game, all
players simultaneously stopped running because in their
common past the umpire whistled, i.e. acted as a common
cause for all players.
The two categories of explanations are local in the
sense that the processes start at a localized place and
propagate locally from one place to an adjacent one.
Hence, the usual terminology reads local common cause,
to emphasize the central importance of locality which lies
at the core of these explanations
It is difficult to imagine any other sort of explanation.
Actually, if one insists that an explanation ought to be
a kind of story that plays out in space and time, then
I believe there is simply no alternative to the previously
mentioned two categories of explanations. Yet, amaz-
ingly, quantum physics predicts entirely different kinds
of correlations, called non-local correlations for reasons
described below. Physics has a word for the cause of
these non-local correlations: entanglement. But physics
offers no story in space and time to explain or describe
how these correlations happen. Hence, somehow, non-
local correlations emerge from outside space-time (for an
explanation of this provocative terminology see appendix
A).
Alice Bob
x y
a b
FIG. 1: For each run of the experiment, Alice and Bob each
freely and independently chose one value x and y, respectively,
and input them into their black boxes; the latter then returns
one and only one outcome a and b to Alice and Bob, respec-
tively. Note that in order to test condition (7), see section II,
the experiment has to be repeated many times until the statis-
tics allows one to infer a good approximation of the probability
p(a, b|x, y).
II. NON-LOCAL CORRELATIONS
Why should anyone believe the existence of nonlocal
correlations? Their existence is predicted by quantum
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theory, as Einstein-Podolsky-Rosen and Schro¨dinger no-
ticed already in 1935 (and actually years before, and also
a few other precursors, see e.g. [1]). But the possibility to
directly observe nonlocal correlation seems, at first sight,
difficult, if at all possible: indeed, one should observe cor-
relations while simultaneously excluding any explanation
of the two categories mentioned in the introduction.
The first type of explanation, i.e. a first system sends
information to the second, is quite easy to control, pro-
fessors do that all the time during exams: they make sure
the students can’t communicate. In this way professors
guarantee that if the exam’s results are correlated it is
not because one student copied the other, but because
they prepared the exam together (i.e. the only remaining
explanation is local common cause). In physics, avoiding
information exchange is straightforward, at least in prin-
ciple: separate the correlated events such that nothing
propagating at the speed of light can leave a system after
the input has been given and reach the other before the
outcome has been secured (one says then that the events
are space-like separated). Let us emphasize this point.
Bob should observe his outcome, i.e. the consequence of
his choice, before anything propagating at most at the
speed of light could reach him carrying any information
about Alice’s choice; and vice-versa Alice should observe
her outcome before any influence of Bob’s choice, propa-
gating at the speed of light, could reach her. Experiments
that do not strictly fulfill this condition are said to suffer
from the ”locality loophole”.
But what about the second category of explanation,
how could one experimentally rule out any local com-
mon cause explanation? The finding of a solution to this
problem is John Bell’s main contribution to physics [2].
It is pretty easy to formalize; let’s have a look at Fig.
1. Alice and Bob should each have access to only a lim-
ited part of space and time. In particular one should
be able to bound where and when the input choices are
made (one by Alice, another one by Bob), and bound
where and when the outcomes are produced and regis-
tered. Note that the inputs and outcomes are standard
(i.e. classical) variables: they can be copied, remembered
and processed as any of the usual information we con-
front daily. For concreteness, assume Alice and Bob put
their inputs and outcomes on the internet so that, af-
ter some time, everyone can access them. Let’s assume
that the correlation p(a, b|x, y) has a common cause ex-
planation. Let λ denote this common cause. We do not
need to know what λ is, so far it is just a symbol. We
make only two assumptions about λ, a serious one and
a technical one. First the serious one: we assume that λ
doesn’t contain any information about Alice’s and Bob’s
free choice: the inputs x and y are independent of λ.
Note that this excludes hyper-determinism: Alice and
Bob can make truly free choices (I’ll come back to this).
This assumption can be formalized: p(x) = p(x|λ). Or
equivalently: I(x : λ) = 0: the (Shannon) mutual infor-
mation between x and λ is nil. The second assumption,
the technical one, guarantees that one can ”count” and
”weight” all the possible common causes λ1. A priori one
doesn’t know λ, but all that is necessary is to be able to
associate probability weights to all the possible λ. For ex-
ample, it suffices to assume that there are only countably
many possible common causes, possibly infinitely count-
able (as the integers). Or, if one insists on the possibility
of a continuous infinity of common causes (e.g. the inputs
depend on the temperature of some location in their com-
mon past), then one has to assume that the set of λ’s is
equipped with a measure such that one can integrate over
the space of λ’s [3].
Now, if the correlation p(a, b|x, y) has some local com-
mon cause explanation that satisfies the two above men-
tioned assumptions, then, for any given λ, the two events
are independent:
p(a, b|x, y, λ) = p(a|x, λ) · p(b|y, λ) (1)
Since, a priori, one doesn’t know λ one has to attribute
a certain probability to each of them: denote ρ(λ) the
probability that the actual common cause is λ. Note
that the function ρ(λ) may be unknown, but it is part
of the local common cause category of explanations to
assume that a ρ exists. Consequently, any common cause
explanation of correlations takes the form:
p(a, b|x, y) =
∑
λ
ρ(λ) p(a|x, λ) · p(b|y, λ) (2)
or if a continuous infinity of λ’s is assumed:
p(a, b|x, y) =
∫
λ
ρ(λ) p(a|x, λ) · p(b|y, λ) dλ (3)
Agreed? The rest of the argument is elementary math-
ematics. In brief, not all correlations p(a, b|x, y) can be
put in the form (2) or (3). Hence, if one observed a
correlation that can’t be written as (2) or (3), one has
observed a correlation that can’t be explained by local
common causes. John Bell introduced a simple inequal-
ity, now generalized to entire families of so-called Bell
inequalities, that are necessarily satisfied by all correla-
tions of the form (2) or (3) [2]. We’ll soon see an example:
(6) and (7). Hence a violation of a Bell inequality is the
signature of a correlation that can’t be written as (2) or
(3).
At this point it is worth emphasizing the interpreta-
tion of λ. Historically the λ were thought of as local
hidden variables by physicists whose hope was to restore
some sort of local classical physics. A more modern view
consists in viewing λ as the physical state of the systems
as described by any possible future theory. Hence, the
violation of a Bell inequality tells us something not only
about today’s quantum physics, but tells us also some-
thing about any possible future theory compatible with
1 Note that one can group the λ’s into equivalence classes where
two λ’s are said equivalent iff they determine precisely the same
probabilities p(a, b|x, y, λ); hence it suffices that one can ”count”
the equivalence classes.
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today’s experiments. That today’s experiments tell us
something important about any possible future theory
is a rare and remarkable fact! Note furthermore how
unrestricted λ is: it could be the state of the entire Uni-
verse, except that λ can’t determine Alice and Bob’s in-
put choices x and y. In this sense it is not λ that is espe-
cially local, all that is assumed local is that Alice’s system
is not influenced by Bob’s distant choice and vice-versa
that Bob’s system is not influenced by Alice’s choice.
As a simple example of a correlation that can’t be ex-
plained by common causes, consider the case where Alice
and Bob have only to carry out a binary choice that we
label 0 and 1, i.e. x, y ∈ {0, 1}, and their outcomes are
also binary: a, b ∈ {0, 1}. Note that this is the sim-
plest possible case: with fewer inputs there would be no
choice at all and with fewer outcomes the choices would
have no consequences. The example goes as follows. Al-
ice’s outcome a is random: p(a|x) = 12 for all inputs x;
similarly Bob’s outcome is random: p(b|y) = 12 for all in-
puts y. But the two outcomes are correlated: whenever
it so happens that Alice and Bob both made the choice
1, i.e. x = y = 1, then their outcomes always differ:
p(a 6= b|x = y = 1) = 1, and for all other combinations
of input choices the outcomes are always equal. Since
x = y = 1 if and only if x · y = 1, this simple correlation
can be captured with a simple relation:
x · y = 0⇒ a = b (4)
x · y = 1⇒ a 6= b (5)
Note that this relation can be cast into a simple equa-
tion a+ b = x · y (addition modulo 2), hence nonlocality
shouldn’t be hidden behind complex mathematics: the
concepts are complex, not the maths. Let’s analyze this
correlation and look for a local common cause explana-
tion. For this purpose we consider the following figure of
merit:
S = p(a = b|x = 0, y = 0) + p(a = b|x = 0, y = 1)
+ p(a = b|x = 1, y = 0) + p(a 6= b|x = 1, y = 1)(6)
Any local common cause λ should, for all possible choices
x by Alice define an output a (or define a probability for
the outcome a), and similarly for Bob. For instance, one
of the possible λ is such that a = b = 0 whatever the
inputs. For such a λ our figure of merit S takes the value
3: the first 3 terms in (6) take value 1, but the last one is
0. It is not difficult to analyze all possible deterministic
λ (those λ’s that determine one and only one outcome on
each side for any possible inputs), indeed there are only
22 · 22 = 16 such λ’s. Analyzing these 16 λ’s one can
easily convince oneself that our figure of merit S never
reaches a value larger than 3. And non-deterministic λ’s
will not perform better (note that they can always be
analyzed as statistical mixtures of the 16 deterministic
λ’s). Consequently, all correlations explainable by local
common causes satisfying the following inequality, named
a Bell inequality:
S ≤ 3 (7)
Let me note for the more specialized readers that
this inequality is strictly equivalent to the well known
CHSH-Bell inequality: it suffices to note that the usual
E(x, y) ≡ p(a = b|x, y) − p(a 6= b|x, y) can equally be
written as E(x, y) = 2p(a = b|x, y) − 1 = 1 − 2p(a 6=
b|x, y), the common form of the CHSH-Bell inequality
follows then from (6) and (7): E(0, 0)+E(0, 1)+E(1, 0)−
E(1, 1) ≤ 2.
To conclude this section, let us emphasize the main
conclusion: the two categories of local explanations for
correlations can be experimentally tested. For this pur-
pose one should observe correlations that violate some
Bell inequality, as for example (7), while making sure
that the two observers, Alice and Bob, can’t be influenced
by any signal coming from the other side propagating at
the speed of light (or slower). If such correlations are
observed, there is no choice but to admit that there are
correlations that can’t be explained by any story in space
and time. Such correlations are thus said to be nonlocal:
there is no ”local explanation”, that is no explanation
based on local causes that propagate from one place to
adjacent ones.
III. EXPERIMENTAL NONLOCALITY
In this section I review some of the recent experiments,
though without any of the important technicalities. Al-
ready in the famous Aspect experiment of 1982 the sides
where space-like separated and the inputs chosen at ”ran-
dom” at the last moment so that no light-signal could
explain the observed correlation [4]. Admittedly there
were no human Alice and Bob making free choices, only
some pseudo-random, even somewhat periodic, choices
where made by appropriate electronics. For scientists
this was already extremely convincing, though since that
time better experiments definitively closing the locality
loophole have been performed [5–7].
All the above experiments observed correlations that
violate a Bell inequality (7). However, there is a lit-
tle catch: in all experiments with photons (particles of
light) there is often no outcome at all. For example, Alice
inputs her choice, but nothing happens. Physicists un-
derstand why this is so, the photon got lost somewhere,
or the detector supposed to register the tiny bit of en-
ergy carried by a single photon failed to do so (no real
detector has 100% efficiency), etc. Nevertheless, this is
a serious loophole, called the detection loophole. Indeed,
it could well be that the detection probability is influ-
enced by the local common cause λ. Today, two exper-
iments have closed this loophole using not photons, but
ions [8, 9]. This was a necessary step, however, in those
two experiments the distance between Alice and Bob was
insufficient to close the locality loophole. Hence, an ex-
periment closing simultaneously the detection and the
locality loophole is still awaited. Almost no physicist ex-
pects a surprise, certainly I do not expect any surprise,
but the logical possibility remains and ought to be closed
by further experiments.
So are we at the end? Do we have to conclude that
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Nature is nonlocal? Are there really correlations that
can’t be explained within space-time, i.e. that somehow
emerge from outside space-time? The situation clearly
deserves further scrutinies. In the remainder of this sec-
tion I would like to analyze two local explanations to-
gether with experimental tests.
The first explanation is, I believe, very intuitive. Ev-
erything looks as if the two parties somehow communi-
cate behind the scene [10]; hence, since they can’t com-
municate at a speed equal or lower than the speed of light,
let’s assume they do so at a speed faster than light. Such
an assumption doesn’t respect the spirit of Einstein rela-
tivity, but this wouldn’t be the first time that an accepted
theory has to be revised [11]. Moreover, it is not crys-
tal clear that such ”communication behind the scene”
would contradict relativity; indeed, one could imagine
that this communication remains for ever hidden to hu-
mans, i.e. that it could not be controlled by humans, only
Nature exploits it to produce correlations that can’t be
explained by usual common causes. To define faster than
light hidden communication requires a universal privi-
leged reference frame in which this faster than light speed
is defined. Again, such a universal privileged frame is not
in the spirit of relativity, but also clearly not in contradic-
tion: for example the reference frame in which the cosmic
microwave background radiation is isotropic defines such
a privileged frame. Hence, a priori, a hidden communica-
tion explanation is not more surprising than nonlocality.
It also has the very nice feature that it can be experimen-
tally tested. The idea is to perform the measurements on
both sides, i.e. give the inputs and collect the outcomes,
quasi-simultaneously. Hence, Bob’s outcome can’t be in-
fluenced by any hypothetical hidden communication and
vice-versa for Alice’s outcome. If the observed correla-
tion is still nonlocal, i.e. still violates Bell’s inequality,
then either the hypothesis of hidden communication is
ruled out, or the speed of the hidden communication is
faster than the bound set by the experimental condition,
in particular by the accuracy of the synchronous timing
and by the distance separating Alice and Bob. But there
remains a conceptual difficulty: since we do not know
which is the privileged reference frame, we do not know
in which reference frame the event should be simultane-
ous. Philippe Eberhard suggested to exploit the rotation
of Earth around its axes to scan all possible reference
frame in 12 hours. This experiments has been carried
out recently near Geneva [12] and has set very stringent
bounds on the speed of any hypothetical hidden commu-
nication: more than 10’000 or 100’000 times the speed of
light, depending on technical details (see also the recent
paper [13]).
Before we come to the second alternative, let me men-
tion that there is another way to define the faster than
light hypothetical hidden communication: it could be
that it is the inertial reference frame of the observer
that determines that privileged frame. This very interest-
ing idea was put forward by Antoine Suarez and Valerio
Scarani in 1997 [14]. A consequence of this assumption is
that, thanks to relativity, if the two observers Alice and
Bob move apart fast enough, they could both, each in its
own inertial reference frame, perform the measurement
before the other, a so called before-before situation. This
experiment was also be carried out in Geneva [15], and
the observed correlation were still nonlocal: the proposal
by Suarez and Scarani could be falsified.
The second way out of the conclusion ”Nature is non-
local” speculates on the fact that in actual experiments
it is not so easy to determine when a choice is made
and when an outcome is produced. Ideally, human Al-
ice and Bob should make conscious choices, but in all
experiments so far the choices are delegated to random
number generators (or, even, no active choice is made,
one merely argues - quite convincingly in my opinion
- that the measurement settings are unknown to λ to
the particles until the moment they reach the measure-
ment apparatuses). Delegating the choices to random
number generator is pretty fine with me. After all, all
what is required is that the choices are independent of
the common past. Assuming that Alice and Bob’s com-
mon past drives all choices made locally at Alice and
Bob’s locations by appropriate electronic or quantum de-
vices seems to imply some sort of hyper-determinism that
would make all Science an illusion (one could never de-
cide to make an experiment, hence one could not test
theories). Accordingly, let’s concentrate on the idea that
the outcome might, in fact, be determined much later
than usually thought [16]. For example, two physicists,
Lajos Diosi and Roger Penrose, independently proposed
that an outcome is produced only once a mass has moved
significantly (both proposed precise formulas relating the
time of the outcome and the motion of the mass, their
formulas agree within a factor 2 [17]). The motivation
for this proposal lies in the difficulty to combine general
relativity and quantum physics. But, never mind, here
it suffice to note that in usual experiments the outcomes
are collected in a computer’s memories, hence without
motion of any significant mass (electrons are very light).
Hence, all observed violation of Bell inequality could be
explained by slower than light influences: the influence
has plenty of time to arrive before any mass moves sig-
nificantly [18]. Fortunately, once again, this assumption
of delayed outcomes can be experimentally tested. We
coupled our detectors to a piezzo that could push a mir-
ror and could thus falsify the Diosi-Penrose explanation
of correlations violating Bell inequality [19].
No doubt that further assumptions will appear. How-
ever, the huge amount of experimental data and the enor-
mous predictive power of quantum physics very convinc-
ingly supports that Nature is nonlocal. So, how do physi-
cist incorporate this amazing conclusion in their world
view? Well, most simply don’t care, most don’t realize
that they are living at a time of a huge conceptual revo-
lution; sadly, most physicists would not have recognized
Copernicus nor Galileo had they been contemporaries of
these giants that carried out this conceptual revolutions.
But there are exceptions that one may classify, roughly,
in two categories: the many-worlds lovers and the others
(to which I belong).
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IV. AGAINST MANY-WORLDS
Basically the solution proposed by the many-worlds
view of quantum physics, also called the multiverse, is to
deny that experiments have unique outcomes [20]. Ac-
cording to this view, everything is quantum, once and
for ever. Hence, the entire reasoning of section II col-
lapses: there are no inputs and no outputs! Actually,
the motivation for many-worlds is not nonlocality, but
the fact that today’s quantum theory offers no answer
as to when a quantum measurement is finished. Hence,
they conclude: quantum measurement are never finished,
everything gets into an enormously complex state of su-
perposition. Somehow, the only real thing is the Hilbert
space and the linearity of Schro¨dinger’s equation2.
I won’t try to present the many-worlds view any fur-
ther; from the little above it should already be clear that
I am not sympathetic with this view. But why am I so
dismissive with this view while, at the same time, very
open to all sort of assumptions like those presented in
the previous section? Two reasons. First, all the as-
sumptions presented in the previous section have an ex-
planatory power. Moreover they could even be experi-
mentally tested (and - even better for me - using tech-
nologies available in my lab!). On the contrary, I do not
see any explanatory power in the many worlds: it seems
to be made just to prevent one from asking (possibly
provocative) questions. Moreover, it has built in it the
impossibility of any test: all its predictions are identi-
cal to those of quantum theory. For me, it looks like a
”cushion for laziness” (un coussin de paresse in French).
And there is a second, decisive, reason to reject the
many-worlds view: it leaves no space for free will. I know
that I enjoy free will much more than I know anything
about physics. Hence, physics will never be able to con-
vince me that free will is an illusion. Quite the contrary,
any physical hypothesis incompatible with free will is fal-
sified by the most profound experience I have about free
will.
So, would I have rejected Newtonian classical mechan-
ics had I lived before quantum physics? Probably not.
Indeed, classical physics leaves open the possibility that
free will can somehow interface with the deterministic
Newtonian equations: free will could set-up some poten-
tial that could slightly influence particles’s motion. This
would be something like Descartes pineal gland. In stan-
dard quantum physics such an interface between free will
and physics could be even simpler: free will could influ-
ence the probabilities of quantum events. This is, admit-
tedly, a vague and not very original idea; but important
is that there is no obvious definite contradiction between
2 Years ago, I once argued that the many-worlds doesn’t seem
compatible with Occam’s razor principle [21]. As answer I got the
following: ”Occam’s razor should not be applied to the physical
world, but be applied to the Schro¨dinger equation; don’t add
any term to this beautiful equation” [22]. The linearity of the
Schro¨dinger equation was assumed more real than our physical
universe!
free will and standard quantum physics. However, the
situation with the many-worlds view is very different.
In the many-worlds view all possibilities co-exist on
equal footing. Accordingly, a being enjoying free will
can’t merely interact with one state of affair of the phys-
ical world, but has to interact with the enormous super-
position of all possible states of affair! But, most likely,
if a specific interaction with one possible state of affair
produce a desired effect, this very same specific inter-
action with most of the other - equally real according to
many-worlds - state of affairs would produce uncontrolled
random effects. Hence, it seems that there is no way to
maintain a possible window for free will in the many-
worlds view. Consequently, I believe the many-worlds
view is excluded by our daily experience.
A possible way out of the above reasoning could be to
envisage that the being enjoying free will is also in an
enormous superposition state and that the branches of
this superposition match the branches of the superposi-
tion of the physical world. Hence, in each branch a story
similar to the one sketched above in the case of Newto-
nian classical mechanics could hold (to maintain hope).
But this ”way out” is an illusion. Indeed, it would imply
that the being enjoying free will actually never makes one
and only one decision, nor experience one and only one
consequence of his choice: he would make a superposition
of all choices and experience all possibly consequences. In
brief, such a being would enjoy no free will at all.
In summary, superpositions and entanglement forever,
i.e. the many-worlds ”solution” to nonlocality, is not com-
patible with our most intimate experience as beings who
enjoy free will. I make choices that have consequences;
hence superpositions and entanglement must end some-
where. And the fact that today’s physics doesn’t know
where they stop doesn’t affect this conclusion at all.
V. CONCLUSION
We have seen that any proper violation of a Bell in-
equality implies that all possible future theories have to
predict nonlocal correlations. In this sense it is Nature
herself that is nonlocal (section II). But how can that be?
How does Nature perform the trick [23]? Leaving aside
some technical loopholes, like a combination of detec-
tion and locality loopholes, the obvious answer, already
suggested by John Bell [10], is that there is some hid-
den communication going on behind the scene. A first
meaning of ”behind the scene” could be ”beyond today’s
physics”, in particular beyond the speed limit set by rel-
ativity. We have seen how this interesting idea can be
experimentally tested (section III) and how difficult it
is to combine this idea with no-signaling (appendix B).
Hence, it is time to take seriously the idea that Nature
is able to produce nonlocal correlations [24]. There are
several ways of formulating this:
1. Somehow God plays dice with nonlocal die: a ran-
dom event can manifest itself at several locations.
2. Nonlocal correlations merely happen, somehow
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from outside space-time, in the sense that no story
in space-time can describe how they happen (see
appendix A).
3. The communication behind the scene happens out-
side space-time
4. Reality happens in configuration space, what we
observe is only its shadow in 3-dimensional space
(this might be the closest to the description pro-
vided by standard quantum physics) [25].
Admittedly, the situation is serious, so much so that
despite the vast evidence further scrutinies should be un-
dertaken. However, at this point we should have the
courage to also seriously consider the possibility that Na-
ture is indeed truly and deeply nonlocal3.
At this point one should ask oneself whether this is
really new or whether similar conclusions already fol-
low from the non-deterministic characteristic of quan-
tum physics? Indeed, one could argue that non-
determinism implies that the cause originates from else-
where, i.e. somewhere outside space-time. But this
doesn’t sound very convincing. I have no problem
with the idea that certain objects may have an intrinsic
propensity to spontaneously act in a stochastic manner.
Furthermore, stochasticity by itself could act purely lo-
cally. Hence, with nonlocality we face something deeply
different.
One logical possibility to avoid the entire argument -
and hence the conclusion ”Nature is nonlocal” - is to deny
the possibility to freely choose inputs and/or collect mea-
surement outcomes. One could invoke some hyperdeter-
minism such that the state of the universe λ necessarily
determines the inputs x and y, but this seems to me like
giving up the entire scientific enterprize. Indeed, with
such a totalitarian determinism there would be no way to
test one’s scientific theories. Alternatively on could deny
that measurements have outcomes, or at least that it
takes in fact much longer for an outcome to be definitive
than usually thought. An example, discussed in section
III, could be that a measurement outcome is definitive
only once a mass has significantly moved. This inter-
esting explanation of the observed correlation could be
experimentally falsified. Another example could be that
a measurement is finished only once a human becomes
conscious of its outcome ... but then, as John Bell put
it, ”does that human need to have a PhD?”. Clearly
such ideas are ill defined, though they deserve further
scrutinies. Finally, pushed to the extreme, one could ar-
gue with the many-worlds ”lovers” that measurements
don’t have outcomes, that all possible outcomes remain
potential in some huge superposition state containing all
3 Many physicist hate this conclusion because they fear that it al-
low faster than light signaling. Hence, let me emphasize that
nonlocality does not necessarily imply faster than light signal-
ing. Actually, today’s paradigm for most specialists is nonlocality
without signaling
possibilities on an equal footing. I have argued in sec-
tion IV that such an extreme view is uninteresting and
necessarily false because it is incompatible with free will.
Admittedly, no physical theory so far has ever been able
to include free will in an interesting way; however, the
many-worlds view seems to be the first one totally incom-
patible with our most intimate experience of free will.
Appendix A: What could it mean that nonlocal
correlations emerge from outside space-time?
In physics we develop mathematical models that allow
us to compute the outcome of some experiments, or their
outcome probabilities, i.e. we have equations. However,
this is only half of theoretical physics. We also develop
stories that describe how things happen. For example the
moon attracts the water in the ocean, hence producing
the tides. Or, we describe the relation between temper-
ature and pressure of a gas by a story like: the gas is
made out of trillions of little particles that move in all
directions; the warmer the gas the faster the particles
on average; when the particles hit the recipient contain-
ing the gas they exercise a small force on it, hence the
trillions of particles all together exercise some pressure
on the container; finally the pressure is larger when the
average velocity of the particles is larger. Who has ever
started a physics course with equation and not with a
story? Clearly, in physics we need stories as much as
equations. For this purpose we have a catalogue of pos-
sible tools to tell our stories. Until recently, all stories
took place in space-time. But, this story-toolbox evolves
as our theories evolve in parallel with our mathematics-
toolbox; see for example the tools used today to talk
about the deformation of space-time in general relativ-
ity.
However, as we have seen in scetion II no story in
space-time can describe nonlocal correlations: we have
no tool in our story-toolbox to talk about nonlocal cor-
relations. Hence, we usually say things like ”event A
influences event B”, or ”event A has a spooky action at a
distance on event B” or ”event A causes a collapse of the
wavefunction at location B”. But we know that this is
all wrong: there is no time ordering between the events
A and B; hence no story in time is appropriate. More-
over, the distance between A and B is irrelevant; hence
the distance should not occur in our story. The usual
reaction to this situation is to give up the search for any
story, i.e. in some sense to give up the very possibility to
make sense of nonlocal correlations, i.e. to understand
them. Some physicists simply claim that the maths are
too complicated, hence we can’t complement the equa-
tions by good stories. But we have seen that the maths
are trivial: this can’t be an excuse to give up!
Admittedly we need to enlarge our story-toolbox. A
difficulty is that the new tool must include some strange
features that can’t be described within space-time. I am
confident that with future quantum technologies this new
piece in our story-toolbox will be familiar to future gen-
erations. Let me give an example of how this new piece
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FIG. 2: Example of a possible new tool to talk about nonlocal
correlations. The inputs x and y and the outcomes a and b
are all bits. As soon as an input is fed into a box, the box pro-
duces a random outcome. But the outcomes hold the following
promise: a+ b = xy (addition modulo 2). This promise holds
irrespective to the inputs time ordering and independently of
the distance between Alice and Bob. As explained in the text,
this is a simple and powerful example of a nonlocal correla-
tion.
could look. Imagine a pair of boxes connected by an
immaterial link, see Fig. 2. Each box can be fed by an
input, denoted x for the first box and y for the second; as
soon as a box receives an input, it produces an outcome
denoted a and b for the first and second box, respectively.
For simplicity imagine that the inputs and outcomes are
binary: both inputs and both outcomes are simply bits,
i.e. a ”0” or a ”1”. Locally the outcomes are random:
locally the boxes just produce noise, but assume that the
outcomes hold the following promises: a + b = xy (ad-
dition modulo 2). This is identical to the relations (4)
and (5). This new tool is unfamiliar to us, but it is quite
simple. Moreover, it contains the essence: the promise
that a + b = xy holds irrespective of the timing where
the inputs are given and holds independently of the dis-
tance between the two boxes; furthermore the correlation
p(a, b|x, y) is nonlocal (i.e. it can’t be described by lo-
cal common causes because it violates the Bell inequality
(7)). This tool is well known to specialists and is referred
to as a ”nonlocal box” [28]. It shares, with quantum non-
local correlations, the important feature that it can’t be
cloned [29] (and the proof is very simple: again a nice
story), accordingly one can also tell a simple story based
on it about quantum cryptography [30]. Finally, let me
mention that with such a nonlocal box all quantum corre-
lations corresponding to two maximally entangled qubits
can be reproduced [31], hence the nonlocal box contains
enough nonlocality to encompass the most usual corre-
lations one encounters in quantum physics. However, to
be fair, I should add that this new tool is insufficient to
tell a story describing quantum teleportation [32].
Hence, more tools are needed. Looking for such
new tools, however, is not standard research in physics.
Nonetheless, can we really expect physics to make
progress and be appreciated by the public, as it should,
if we give up the possibility to tell stories about it?
Appendix B: Hidden Communication without
hidden variables
Experiments can only set bounds on the speed of any
possible faster than light hidden communication. What
about infinite speed? and could a theoretical argument
refute the possibility of hidden communication at an ar-
bitrarily fast but finite speed?
Let me first briefly comment on the idea of hidden
communication at infinite speed. Frankly, I have difficul-
ties making sense of such an assumption: essentially it
implies that everything could instantaneously influence
everything else [26].
Alice
Bob
Charlie
ΨABC=|GHZ=|000+|111
Perfect
Synchronization
No time for
hidden 
communication
signaling
signaling
FIG. 3: In such a configuration, if all correlations are due to
hidden communication behind the scene, then Alice can signal
faster than light to Bob/Charlie.
Interestingly, however, the second question has at least
a partial and positive answer. Indeed, one can prove that
there are 3-party scenarios in which any explanation of
distant correlations based purely on hidden communica-
tion (at any finite speed), hence without any additional
local variable λ, would allow one to signal faster than
light [27]. The argument runs as follows [25]. Imagine
that the 3 players, Alice, Bob and Charlie, share a GHZ
state of 3 qubits: (|000〉 + |111〉)/√2. Alice is far both
from Bob and from Charlie. Bob and Charlie are not
as far from each other, but still far enough that their
input-outcome events are space-like separated, see Fig.
3. Further, imagine that Bob and Charlie synchronize
their events so well that there is no time for the hidden
communication to influence each other. Consequently, if
Alice does nothing, but Bob and Charlie measure their
qubits in the standard {|0〉,|1〉} basis, then they observe
random and uncorrelated outcomes. Indeed, all qubits
are locally in a random state and there is, by assumption,
no time for any influence (even at a speed possibly faster
than light, but finite). If, however, Alice makes a mea-
surement, also in the standard basis, long enough before
Bob and Charlie (in the privileged reference frame) so
that the hidden communication from Alice to Bob and
to Charlie has time to arrive, then Bob and Charlie’s
outcome are correlated: they are both equal to Alice’s
outcome. Hence, if Bob and Charlie compare their re-
sults, they know whether Alice made a measurement or
not, i.e. there is signaling from Alice to (Bob,Charlie).
Note that comparing Bob and Charlie’s result takes some
time, but since Alice could be arbitrarily far away, there
is clearly a possibility that the signaling from Alice to
(Bob,Charlie) is faster than light.
The above argument illustrates how difficult it is to
modify quantum physics while maintaining nonlocality
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without signaling. However, the sketched argument is
clearly of limited scope: it is easy to avoid signaling by
adding some local variables λ and by assuming that if the
hidden communication doesn’t arrive on time, then the
outcomes are determined by these additional λ’s. It is
thus desirable to extend the argument to include mixed
models, that is a mix of hidden communication and ad-
ditional local variables λ. It would be nice to show that
any such mixed model necessarily activates signaling in
some multi-partite scenarios. I find this research program
highly interesting.
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